The United States has just
concluded a remarkable exercise in diplomacy. It has opened up a
possibility for peaceful resolution of the crisis over Iraq that
few would have thought conceivable only three months ago. While
the process may have resembled the old adage about watching
sausage being made, it has resulted in a tough, clear directive to
Saddam Hussein.
By credibly threatening
unilateral military action to resolve an Iraqi problem that has
festered for years, the administration achieved two objectives.
First, it induced the United Nations Security Council to face up
to its responsibilities. Second, by declaring that the only sure
solution to the Iraqi problem was regime change by military force,
the administration maximized the odds that Saddam Hussein would
take the United States seriously, accept U.N. authority and avoid
a conflict that could well involve incalculable consequences for
the region. The result: unanimous agreement in the Security
Council that an international outlaw regime must return forthwith
to lawful behavior, and unmistakable determination to use military
force if it does not. A remarkable outcome, notwithstanding that
the process by which it was achieved has left wide resentment and
bruised feelings on the part of those who believe the United
States has behaved in a unilateral and arrogant manner that failed
to take their interests and concerns adequately into account.
What now? Saddam Hussein, having
accepted the Security Council's resolution, has two options. He
can cooperate and comply fully -- unlikely, given his past record.
Or he can choose a temporizing strategy, testing U.N. resolve but
cooperating just enough -- by his calculations -- to avoid
military action against him. Since his most basic objective is
certainly to stay in power, he is likely to try to buy time
through minimal compliance, hoping that the international resolve
to resort to force will wane. If so, the biggest risk is that he
will miscalculate -- perhaps sooner rather than later -- what he
must do and what he can get away with. This most likely course
could take some time to work itself out, whatever the eventual
outcome.
While the inspection process is
underway, the administration could launch another diplomatic
initiative that could rival the triumph it just scored, and at the
same time reinforce the success it has just achieved. This
initiative would take the form of devoting the same kind of skill,
audacity and laser-like attention to the Israeli-Palestinian
issue. Such a move could assuage some of the ill will stimulated
in the Middle East and Europe by the hard-hitting Iraq initiative.
It would show U.S. determination to deal with the one issue that
is the primary lens through which the Arab world views the United
States. It would also reduce the appeal of al Qaeda and other
terrorist groups and the negative reaction that would ensue should
force against Iraq prove necessary. In sum, it would not only
address a critical security problem but also strengthen and
sustain the international coalition that has been forged on the
Iraq issue. In so doing it would help doom a "buy time"
strategy by Saddam Hussein.
How might this work? The United
States has already taken a first step by developing, with its
partners in the "Quartet" (the international consulting
group consisting of the United States, the United Nations, the
European Union and Russia), a road map for the achievement of a
Palestinian state by 2005. Some will argue that it would be
imprudent, even dangerous, to push further at a time when Israelis
(and perhaps the Palestinians) are facing elections. But the
contrary might well be true. With the selection of its new leader,
the Labor Party has put the peace process at the top of Israel's
election agenda. The administration owes the parties a clear
statement of its vision. Presenting it at this time could provide
both the Israeli and Palestinian publics a broader perspective on
the most important issue facing them even as they engage in the
election process.
The outlines of a process are
already clear. The Palestinians need to end terrorist attacks and
reform the Palestinian Authority. To require total compliance as a
precondition, however, is simply to put control of the process in
the hands of those on both sides who do not want it to succeed.
Steps toward reform of the Palestinian Authority have already
begun. We should define its requirements in non-personal terms, to
avoid putting ourselves in the position of supporting democracy,
but only if it elects Palestinians we prefer.
For the Israeli side, there must
be a willingness to pull back forces from West Bank population
centers short of a total cessation of violence -- which no one can
guarantee. Any type of settlement expansion must cease.
For the United States and its
partners in the Quartet, there should be a willingness to outline
in greater detail the nature of a Palestinian state, and to
provide some sort of presence -- including military personnel at
least from the United States and the European Union -- as Israel
pulls back from its occupation in the West Bank.
None of this is new. But a
clear, high-profile U.S. effort to move with vigor to build on our
Iraqi diplomatic success with progress on the region's most vexing
and intractable problem could open the way for change in the
region that could be revolutionary, supporting all U.S.
aspirations for the area. It could attenuate -- perhaps even
reverse -- deepening anti-American feelings in the Middle East,
feelings that, if left unchecked, may threaten our security.