As a tanker carrying 42,000 tons of heavy fuel oil steams toward North Korea, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization is meeting in New York today to consider whether the precious cargo should be delivered to support Pyongyang's energy needs. KEDO, led by the U.S., South Korea and Japan, should direct the tanker to return home. It is time to chart a different course, one that could produce a comprehensive solution to the current crisis in Korea.

Stable and Secure

U.S. objectives in Korea are clear. We seek a peninsula that is (1) stable and secure, and (2) free of nuclear weapons.

For half a century we have assured the first objective through a rock-ribbed security commitment to South Korea backed by unquestionable military force, now represented by 37,000 American troops. Since 1994, we have pursued the second through the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework, which shut down North Korea's plutonium production program in exchange for the offer of light-water reactors and heavy fuel oil.

Debating the virtues and defects of that accord does not constitute a policy prescription for the future. As a practical matter, the Agreed Framework has defined the nuclear equation in Korea. We should salvage its useful elements, especially the verified freeze on construction and operation of nuclear facilities that would already have produced enough plutonium for dozens of nuclear weapons, and would be adding 30 fresh bombs-worth annually. But we should also take the opportunity raised by the current crisis to move beyond the Framework to a comprehensive solution to the North Korean nuclear threat.

So long as North Korea continues to defy its international nonproliferation commitments, KEDO should not provide heavy fuel oil and the light-water reactor project North Korea expects under the Framework. We should warn Pyongyang that any move to separate the five or six bombs' worth of plutonium now sitting in spent fuel rods at Yongbyon under international monitoring would pose a clear and present danger to the U.S. and its allies. A surgical strike against Yongbyon could be the only way to prevent the North from greatly expanding whatever nuclear weapon capabilities it may now possess.

Before holding any bilateral discussions, we should insist that Pyongyang now add uranium enrichment to the existing freeze on plutonium separation. We must not engage Pyongyang in dialogue at the same time it is violating past commitments.

Once the expanded freeze is verifiably in place, we should seek the dismantlement of Pyongyang's uranium enrichment program, shipment of the existing spent fuel out of North Korea, and continuation of the plutonium freeze until its reprocessing capabilities are also dismantled.

These commitments should be supported by international inspections of any sites suspected of illicit nuclear activities beyond the declared Yongbyon nuclear complex. The U.S. should be prepared to respond to North Korean actions to eliminate their nuclear threat -- covering uranium, plutonium, and inspections -- by addressing the issues Pyongyang raised to justify their actions, including their stated fear of assault on their borders or sovereignty.

If Pyongyang rejects a freeze, then the international community should respond to the continuing breach of its nonproliferation commitments through the imposition of sanctions -- including embargoes on trade and investment, and bans on remittances from offshore Koreans to the North -- until North Korea satisfies the world that it is complying fully with its nonproliferation obligations.

While the nuclear issue is the most urgent, North Korean ballistic missile activities and forward-deployed conventional forces also pose a serious threat to regional and global security. It would be in our self-interest to address the full range of security issues posed by North Korea in a manner that opened the door to the full range of political and economic benefits from improved relations enjoyed by the vast majority of the community of nations.

As North Korea translates commitment into performance, so should we. Opening North Korea to increased contact with the outside world would introduce the fresh air of democratic ideas and culture that may help North Korea escape the blight of its own failed system. It surely is in our interest to bring these benefits to the North Korean people, who have every right to the freedom and prosperity already enjoyed by their South Korean neighbors.

If diplomacy and sanctions fail, the U.S. may have no alternative to the use of force against Pygongyang's nuclear program. No doubt military options will be beset with severe difficulties -- identifying the right targets, securing allied support, and building up sufficient military forces in the region to deter any foolish but sanguinary North Korea response.

For that reason it may be prudent to consult South Korea about intensifying our combined military exercises on the peninsula. In the meantime, loose talk denigrating our military options is a serious mistake, undermining a half-century investment -- sealed in American blood -- in standing up to North Korean aggression. As President Bush has made clear, the U.S. must reserve the right to take military action to confront a nuclear-armed threat rather than run the risk of enduring a nuclear attack.

International Effort

As the president suggested at the United Nations, the issue of nuclear proliferation is not bilateral in nature. Rather it pits the offending party against the whole international community, which needs to respond with one voice. China, which shares our objectives of a stable and nuclear-free peninsula and may have the most extensive contacts with North Korea, can be especially helpful.

President Bush should continue to lead a unified international effort to halt the North Korean nuclear threat before Pyongyang's growing capabilities -- and desperation -- combine to undermine the peace and security of the region and the world..