What does it mean to be at war with terrorism? With military operations underway, and with many Americans feeling more vulnerable even than in the days of World War I there is a natural desire to find reference points - something to measure this conflict against. The most recent one is, of course, the Persian Gulf War.

At first glance, there would seem to be little in common between the Gulf War and the present crisis, other than the surprising manner in which both presented themselves. The crisis in the Persian Gulf appears, in retrospect, more straightforward and traditional: The enemy was precisely located, highly visible and arrayed in strength that we could calculate with some precision. The target presented was a massive military force, and the challenge was to counter it with a superior military force.

Our objectives in the Gulf War were clear from the outset, though many have thought - mostly after the fact - that those objectives were too limited. It’s interesting to speculate, in the light of our current circumstances, how the situation might now be different had we added occupation of Iraq and removal of Saddam Hussein to those objectives.. Our Arab allies, refusing to countenance an invasion of an Arab colleague, would have deserted us, creating an atmosphere of hostility to the United States in the region. In addition, the situation of the United States’ being in hostile occupation of an Arab land might well have spawned scores of Osama bin Ladens.

This, of course, does have implications for any military ground operations in which we might engage in Afghanistan. But while Sept. 11 and the invasion of Kuwait are poles apart in most ways, there is one critical aspect in which they are strikingly similar . The war on terrorism will be, if anything, even more dependent on coalition-building than was the Gulf War.

The liberation of Kuwait wouldn’t have been possible without the development of a strong coalition of countries that provided military forces, bases, staging areas, intelligence, isolation of Iraq and strong moral and political support. Former president George H. W. Bush worked tirelessly to build and maintain a coalition of disparate countries with many different perspectives, objectives, prejudices and capabilities.

One constant fear was that this coalition was so “unnatural” that it could not long survive, especially facing the tensions to which Saddam Hussein subjected it. Thanks to enormous and unceasing efforts, especially on the part of the president, it did survive, and it made victory possible. It also allowed the United States to play its role as world leader in the best possible way, with the acquiescence, indeed support, of the world community.

To succeed in the present conflict, it is essential that we repeat the coalition-building of the Gulf conflict, though it could well be more difficult this time. The potential members are even more disparate, the goals more nebulous, the means less obvious and the time frame indefinite. But we already hear voices declaring that the United States is too focused on a multilateral approach. The United States knows what needs to be done, these voices say, and we should just go ahead and do it. Coalition partners just tie our hands, and they all will exact a price for their support.

Those are the same siren songs of delusion and defeat that we heard in 1990. We can no more succeed in our present campaign by acting unilaterally than we could have in 1990. If anything, we are more dependent on friends and allies now than we were in the Gulf crisis. If we are to win this war in any real sense of the word, we will need to do several things. Intelligence will be a key factor. The cooperation of the intelligence services of every friend and ally we can muster will greatly magnify our strength. More specifically, the terrorists must communicate in order to coordinate their activities. We need to get inside those communications wherever they may take place. To do that effectively will require significant international assistance.

The terrorists need money. We must go after the network of funds that supports terrorism. That is clearly impossible without widespread and determined international cooperation.

Finally, we need to penetrate the terrorist organizations. In many cases, that can be done far more effectively by others than by the United States.

If we can do all these things effectively, we can master the terrorist menace. If we can’t, no amount of homeland defense will compensate. Success means a coalition, a broad coalition, a willing and enthusiastic coalition. That will take unbelievable effort and entail endless frustrations. But we did it in 1990 and we can do it again. In addition, if we. build such a coalition, it can produce benefits far beyond the principal purpose of running terrorism to ground. It can help erase the reputation the United States has been developing of being unilateral and indifferent, if not arrogant, to others. It can bring us together in a spirit of cooperation with countries with whom we currently have problems of various kinds, such as Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan. It pan even help unblock issues that have seemed intractable for generations - e.g., the Arab-Israeli confrontation, With the Europeans, it could provide the opportunity to reestablish the kind of cooperative warmth that used to characterize our relations.

If we act with wisdom and perseverance, we may be able not only to deal effectively with the war on terrorism but also to take a major step toward solving a number of foreign policy issues having little or nothing to do with terrorism.