Brent Scowcroft: "The Tools for Peace"

On April 4, President Bush set forth a comprehensive strategy to deal with the deepening spiral of death and destruction in the Middle East. At that moment there were numerous voices urging that Israel be left free to deal with the terrorist problem in its own fashion. As the president recognized, however, pursuing that course would not serve Israeli or American interests.

His speech outlined a strategy based on three key premises. First, by itself, the Israeli strategy could never achieve an outcome in which Israelis would have a reasonable expectation of living in peace and security. Second, by themselves, the Israelis and Palestinians could not resolve the conflict. Indeed, both sides were hostage to the actions of suicide bombers who regard both Ariel Sharon and Yasser Arafat as their enemy. Third, core U.S. interests -- going beyond the commitment to Israel and participation in the Mideast peace process -- were at stake, demanding active, sustained U.S. engagement.

The genius of the strategy he outlined was that it would wrest the initiative from the extremists on both sides and permit sustained movement toward a resolution of the conflict.

The first undertaking is to halt the cycle of violence. The speech set out responsibilities for those parties principally associated with accomplishing that task. Of Arafat, a cease-fire was required and, together with the Arab states, a real and convincing severing of terrorism from pursuit of the Palestinian cause and an unequivocal attack on it for the evil it is. Required of Sharon was a credible pullback from the territories returned to the Palestinian Authority by the Oslo accords.

Praising the Saudis for their peace proposal initiative and the Arab states for moving toward recognition of Israel's right to exist, the president said that the Arab states had to complete their acceptance of Israel as a nation and neighbor and to step forward as Israel stepped back, assuming responsibilities for peace.

It is time now for decisive leadership and determination of a high order, time to insist on implementation of the president's strategy. Israel must withdraw from the Oslo territories as Arafat concurrently implements a clampdown and total rejection of terrorism. An interim interposition of an international force between the hostile parties would provide physical evidence of the commitment of the international community, while offering a buffer as the process moves forward. Such a force would have to include the United States to be palatable to the Israelis. It should include, as well, participants from Europe or, perhaps, the "Quartet" parties (United States, European Union, Russia, United Nations).

Having achieved and reinforced a mutual cease-fire, focus on a peace conference and final settlement could begin. Overall conditions are certainly too fragile to sustain progress in the face of continued suicide attacks and consequent reaction. Therefore, the luxury of proceeding by way of interim steps and agreements is a recipe for failure, and achievement of a virtual final settlement will be the required outcome.

To be successful, the United States should precede a conference by careful consultation with key Arab states and Israel to fashion a consensus on the broad parameters of a settlement, which would be presented to the conference. The clear -- if unstated -- bargain would be Israeli concurrence on the deal based on the assurance that the Arab states would deliver Arafat.

The main elements of a settlement are clear. They include Arab recognition of Israel as a nation and a neighbor; an independent, contiguous Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, with security rectifications agreed on by both sides; a Jerusalem resolution along the lines of Taba; right of return limited to Palestinian areas, in return for removal of Israeli settlements not contiguous to Israeli territory; and an end to tacit support of terrorists and terrorism. The stakes for the United States in this process are very high. This month the president goes to Europe for a critical conference of NATO and Russia, and for a summit meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Those meetings could do much to shape the future security structure of the Eurasian continent. The president can go to these important meetings under heavy attack for presiding over a Middle East in flames, or he can go as a confident leader who, after a half-century of conflict, has put the Middle East on a path to security and peace.