The United States has an enormous stake in the peace talks between Israel and Syria, and the Clinton administration has indicated it would be willing to ease the financial burden that any deal would entail.  What may be on the table at some point, however, is something more controversial: a long-term American presence on the Golan Heights.

Unlike the multifaceted controversy between Israel and the Palestinians over the West Bank, the is sues between Syria and Israel are overwhelmingly about security. Put simply, whichever country occupies or can quickly seize the Golan has a significant strategic advantage over t other. Given t fact that Israel and Syria have fought three wars since 1947, It is not plausible that either would he willing to trust its security to the good will of the other.

If asked, we should do all we can to ensure Mideast security.

Thus it is very possible that the security each side seeks could be satisfied only by an outside presence on the border, it is unlikely that Prime Minister Ebud Barak would agree to United Nations peacekeepers, given Israel previous experience with such an international force. In 1967 the United Nations pulled its troops from the Sinai Peninsula upon tile demands of President Nasser of Egypt; the Six-Day War followed.

The only outside presence the two sides would be likely to agree on would be the United States (or possibly the United States as well as an other power chosen by Syria).

Of course, an Amer military presence should be considered only ii both Israel and Syria request it. But if they do, given the tens of billions of dollars the United States has poured Into the area and the recurrence of conflict in the region over the decades, we should be prepared to give a substantial American security guarantee.

The history of the area makes clear that it would be unacceptable to deploy a token force or an unarmed peacekeeping presence that could be easily brushed aside in a crisis. Therefore, if it were an essential element of a peace settlement the United States should be prepare to deploy combat units equipped or ready to use force against any a tempted armed incursion across U border.

Some Americans might object that this would be costly and tie down our forces in yet another global hot sp for an indeterminate period of time. True on both counts, but given the preoccupation of the United State for more than 50 years with Mideast security and the vast costs we hay already incurred, the price in money and manpower does not seem unreasonable. And the uniqueness of the situation should keep it from setting an irresistible precedent for tutor deployments elsewhere. After all, w now have combat forces deployed to indefinite periods in regions far les critical to our national interests, like Bosnia and Kosovo.

Would we be creating another situation like that in Lebanon in the 1980’s with our soldiers subjected to dead guerrilla warfare? Not likely. In this case the parties would have agreed this deployment as being in their best security interests, and Syria has been quite meticulous in preventing lesions across the Syrian-Israeli be in’ in violation of agreements.

Of course, we should hope that Syria and Israel can on their own work out deal that does not require a Unit’ States p But if the two sides determine that deploying American troops on the Golan is the only w security can be guaranteed, our national interest dictates that we do so.