In an underground tunnel at Hwaderi, Kim Jong Il has tested not only a possible nuclear weapon, but also the mettle of the international community.  Will it mount effective action to confront and reverse Pyongyang’s threat, or will it splinter and sputter with empty rhetoric? 

 

If confirmed, Pyongyang’s nuclear arms allow it to threaten – and deliver – vast devastation against any foe.  The delivery system could be as crude as a truck or a tramp steamer.  The North may escalate with further nuclear or missile tests to intimidate – or extract concessions from – its neighbors.  The resulting political and economic instability – possibly including a new nuclear arms race – could spread through Asia and beyond.  The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, already battered by Iran’s nuclear adventures, will further erode as the cornerstone of global efforts to stop the bomb’s threat. 

 

Perhaps most chillingly, North Korea now boasts a tested nuclear weapon design that it could transfer to states or terrorists hostile to the United States and its allies, especially if the regime becomes desperate or unstable.  

 

What to do now?  The North Korean test should not alter US objectives: a Korean peninsula that is free of nuclear weapons, stable and secure.  For too long, the world has allowed Kim Jong Il to develop nuclear weapons without taking any action that could undermine his confident grip on political power.  The test at Hwaderi may now galvanize the international community to force North Korea to choose between its nuclear ambitions and its political stability.  

 

The universal condemnation Pyongyang’s defiance has inspired – including from Presidents Hu Jintao and Putin – may now support the imposition of Chapter 7 sanctions by the UN Security Council, which can be implemented by force if necessary.   The sanctions may start modestly and gradually increase.

 

In order to succeed, the sanctions need full support over a sustained period, especially from the two countries with greatest leverage over North Korea: China and South Korea.  The Hwaderi test may persuade both governments that failure to respond firmly to the nuclear challenge will stoke rather than abate the instability that North Korea’s neighbors understandably wish to avoid.  Were Beijing to curtail oil shipments or Seoul to suspend economic support for Pyongyang, the effects would be felt directly by the military and elite groups in North Korea that need to be convinced to change course.

 

But China and South Korea will not join a strategy that involves only isolation and pressure on the North.  In exchange for imposing meaningful sanctions, Beijing and Seoul will expect an up-front commitment that Washington will respond positively if North Korea verifiably abandons its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.  The United States should therefore agree now to participate fully in implementing the statement of principles agreed by the six parties in September 2005, should North Korea uphold its end of the bargain.   Under that statement, in exchange for North Korean disarmament, the other parties – including the United States – would provide security assurances, economic and other assistance (possibly including nuclear power stations) and a path toward normalization of relations between Pyongyang, Tokyo, and Washington.     

 

This approach requires a clear sense of priorities.  While the United States must not abandon its support for human rights and opposition to missile proliferation, only the North Korean nuclear program threatens millions of American lives.  We must therefore provide an “escape hatch” from sanctions if North Korea reduces the nuclear threat that justifies sanctions in the first place.  Pyongyang needs a face-saving way to say “yes” to the offer, if sanctions so weaken the regime as to loosen its attachment to nuclear weapons.

 

To spell out this choice clearly and credibly enough to arrest Pyongyang’s march toward greater nuclear weapon capabilities will be extremely difficult.  But the job will only get harder the longer we wait, and the more nuclear capability we allow North Korea to develop.  And the consequences of failure are so grave that we must bend every effort to avoid it.

 

 Daniel Poneman, a Principal in The Scowcroft Group, served on the National Security Council staff under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton.  Michael Green, Associate Professor at Georgetown University and Japan Chair and Senior Adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, served on the National Security Council staff under President George W. Bush.