Brent Scowcroft "Confronting Terrorism"

The National Commission on Terrorism recently issued a final report of its lengthy deliberations, under the title "Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism." It is a comprehensive analysis and series of
recommendations for dealing with this sinister threat to the lives of iinnocent people everywhere. Many of the Commission's recommendations are dramatic, if not controversial. At risk of being lost among some of the more eye-catching proposals is a section concluding that good intelligence is the best anti-terrorist weapon.

This conclusion alone makes the entire Commission effort worthwhile. We must recognize that we will not make progress in the war against terrorism, let alone win it, by building Jersey walls around our public buildings and official residences, or by turning American embassies into structures resembling strong points on the Maginot Line. Prudent precautions are certainly appropriate, but we will never effectively address terrorism solely by being on the defensive. Indeed, the image of America we project by buttoning ourselves up behind concrete redoubts and concertina wire is not the America we are -- and certainly not the America we wish to display to others.

Prevention, not defense, must be at the heart of our strategy. A primary instrument of that offensive strategy is intelligence. Terrorists depend heavily on surprise for their success. If we can anticipate their moves, we can almost always keep them off balance, and often will be able to thwart their nefarious activities. To do that, however, takes human intelligence operations of a high order. Unfortunately, the domestic political climate, especially in the Congress, has served to constrain the ability of the intelligence community to operate effectively in this arena. Terrorists live in a world in which the rules, mores, and other trappings of civilization are almost entirely absent. They are single purpose, dedicated, and allow nothing -- nothing -- to stand in their way. We are singularly ill-equipped to deal in this kind of world. To operate effectively in this arena, we have to alter dramatically the comfortable manner in which we prefer to conduct intelligence activities. We have to abandon our preference for "antiseptic" technical intelligence in favor of human intelligence -- real people on the ground. Many case officers must take off their coats and ties and come out from under the comfort and security of official "cover" as embassy officials to allow them to blend with the local scenery. They must recruit -- or contract with -- those who move freely in this nether world. This type of person is not likely to be warmly welcomed in a Rotary Club. As a result, we have tended over the years to abandon these "unsavory" ways of doing business.

It will undoubtedly be charged that emphasis on such intelligence practices makes us little different from the terrorists themselves, and that we cannot permit the end to justify the means. But terrorists are willing to do anything, sacrifice anything (including their lives) to accomplish their mission. This is why they are effective. Bombing terrorist camps is fruitless -- by and large, terrorists don't care who or how many get killed. Preventing them from carrying out their operations (and even sealing off the funding which provides them equipment and movement -- which itself would require penetration of their structures) attacks them through their chief vulnerabilities. Even imperfect success in such counter-terrorist intelligence practices would be effective. Instilling in the terrorists a fear that their organizations and operations have been penetrated would sow suspicion and dissension in their ranks and greatly reduce their efficiency of operation. However, the effectiveness of these weapons in the war on terrorism rests on the quality of intelligence -- intelligence that often can be acquired only by distinctly "un-antiseptic" means and people.

We have to decide whether we are really serious about dealing with terrorism or would prefer, instead, to restrict ourselves to "clean" intelligence collection and the expenditure of enormous sums on actions that will remain significantly ineffective. The National Commission on Terrorism has done a great service in exposing this unpleasant reality.