President Bush’s May 1 speech outlined his vision of a new strategic framework to replace the increasingly inadequate, if not outmoded, concepts borne of Cold War bilateral confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although this new framework still has deterrence at its core, it includes several additional features, most notably, ballistic missile defenses (BMD).

The speech confirmed what already was a virtual certainty: the United States is determined to proceed with missile defenses. With the previous Clinton administration and the majority of both houses of Congress already on record in support of BMD, for all practical purposes, the domestic political debate on that fundamental question is – or at least ought to be – over. The muted response to the Bush speech in Europe and Asia, from our allies, Russia, and China, can be traced to an acknowledgement of this political reality.

At the same time, it is worth emphasizing that the Bush speech is a broad outline, not a detailed plan or finished proposal. It articulates several premises, principles, and objectives, but also leaves a great number of blanks to be filled in. As such, it can be viewed as an initial set of parameters within which to conduct the “real consultations” that have been promised, not only internationally, but also with the Congress and the American people.

In that spirit, what follows are some of the implications and conclusions that can be derived from the current debate and added to the set of parameters to guide future consultations.

The ballistic missile threat is real and missile defenses are part of the response to that threat. Even Russian President Putin conceded these points in his recent exchange with NATO Secretary General George Robertson. That said, as President Bush’s May 1 speech noted, defenses are only one part of a larger, yet-to-be articulated strategy to respond to the proliferation of ballistic missiles. Moreover, ballistic missiles are not the only threat we face. Indeed, the deployment of effective missile defenses could well steer would-be proliferators away from ballistic missiles and toward other delivery means (e.g., covertly deployed cruise missiles) for which we also lack effective defenses. What remains to be determined is what priority BMD should be given in the competition for scarce defense dollars, and how other elements of the strategy can ease the demand placed on missile defenses.

Missile defenses would not change the existential strategic nuclear deterrence that continues to exist between the United States and Russia and, to a lesser extent, the United States and China. What is changing is (a) the growing proliferation of ballistic missile capabilities to other countries, and (b) the emerging technical capability to defend against the relatively small number of relatively unsophisticated missiles these countries are likely to possess. What missile defenses would add is the prospect that any such attack would be futile as well as suicidal.

It follows that the objective of missile defenses should be to defend against attacks by rogue states. Politically and strategically, these are the emerging threats that not only we face, but also our allies and former adversaries confront. As such, they provide a basis for cooperation that transcends the habits of thought and action left over from the Cold War. Moreover, as a practical matter, this is all we will likely to be able to do technically, because countries like Russia and China will have the economic and technological wherewithal to overwhelm any defenses we might deploy.

For strategic, conceptual, and political reasons, the line between “national missile defenses” (NMD) and “theater missile defenses” (TMD) should be erased. First, we would not be appreciably better off if we could defend ourselves against nuclear blackmail by rogue states, but our friends and allies – to say nothing of our own forward-deployed forces – could not. Second, the ballistic missile threat faced by our allies and our forward-deployed forces is both larger and more urgent than that confronting the U.S. homeland. It would make no sense to rush to defend against more distant threats while neglecting the clear and present missile dangers we face. Third, there is likely, in any case, to be substantial technical and operational overlap between “theater” and “national” defenses, and drawing distinctions between them introduces both needless confusion and inefficiencies.

Russian and Chinese cooperation or opposition could make the missile defense job vastly easier or considerably more difficult. On the one hand, Moscow and Beijing could use their influence and take other actions to reduce proliferation, making the missile defense job easier. (For example, the size and character of the ballistic missile threat posed by a North Korea or an Iran presumably would have a bearing on how we proceed with our missile defense deployments.) On the other hand, they could proliferate technologies and capabilities that rogue states could use to defeat our missile defenses. Indeed, they could play a major role in the proliferation of rogue states that threaten our interests. Put simply, one key to the success of our missile defense efforts will be how Russia and China respond. For this reason and others, we have a major stake in not simply settling for Moscow and Beijing’s sullen acquiescence in the inevitable, but instead trying to find ways to engage their concerns and elicit their active support.

If at all possible, the ABM Treaty should be revised or replaced, rather than simply abandoned. Effective defenses against rogue state attacks probably cannot be developed, and surely cannot be deployed under the terms of the current Treaty. But there is no intrinsic reason why limited missile defenses cannot be deployed in the context of an updated agreement or new set of arrangements that preserve the Treaty’s core objective of stable deterrence among the major nuclear powers. The ABM Treaty should not be regarded as some sort of sacred arms control totem that must remain inviolate. At the same time, it does have a significance in US relations not only with Russia, but also with our allies and other countries that goes beyond its specific legal obligations and strategic effects. It therefore should not be abrogated unless and until it is necessary to do so.

Taken together, these observations suggest an approach to ballistic missile defenses that might be thought of as making a virtue of three necessities:

1. Recognizing the technical possibilities and limitations, the stated purpose of missile defenses should be to help deal with the proliferation threat posed by rogue state ballistic missiles. In what would be little more than a statement of the technically obvious, the goal of defending against Chinese, to say nothing of Russian, ballistic missiles, should be explicitly eschewed. Similarly, the capability to defend against unauthorized or accidental launches of Chinese and Russian missiles should be treated as the added, if somewhat limited, benefit of a capability against rogue states rather than as a separate requirement that will drive the technical complexity and cost of the system.
    
2. Recognizing that active allied cooperation will be a practical necessity as well as a strategic requirement, there should be an integrated approach – in funding, time-phasing, doctrine, and diplomacy to – “national” missile defenses and “theater” missile defenses. Put differently, a “unilateral” U.S. approach to missile defenses would be at least unwise, and might well prove to be infeasible.
    
3. Recognizing that Russia and China will be a major part of the problem if they are not a real part of the solution, a key component of a missile defense strategy should be a serious and sustained effort to engage both countries on fashioning a common vision of the future, building a sense of a shared fate, and cooperating on practical, tangible measures to deal with future security threats we and they face together. A beneficial by-product of engaging Russia and China in this way might be a new set of arrangements to replace the ABM Treaty.

Even if a consensus were achieved on an approach along these lines, the missile defense debate would be far from settled. A number of questions would remain to be addressed, starting with the relationship between missile defenses and strategic offensive nuclear forces, and the implications of substantial reductions in nuclear forces for a strategy in which defenses play an important role. Then there are matters of technology, development programs, and reconciling other defense priorities that will compete with missile defense programs for defense dollars. Taking an “integrated” approach to missile defenses requires engaging questions about burden and technology sharing with our allies and others. Finally, there are questions about how missile defenses fit into the larger strategy to counter the rogue state threat, and how that strategy will adapt to the countermoves that rogue states can be expected to make in response to missile defenses. But to the extent that common ground can be found, the ensuing debate will be characterized by more light than just heat, and the outcome more likely to advance U.S. national security interests.