There is a great deal of "heavy lifting" facing the new administration on its foreign policy accounts. The general euphoria or "honeymoon" which followed the end of the Cold War is over and eight years of on and off concentration on various foreign policy issues have taken their toll. Despite some clear successes, foreign policy problems have begun piling up around the world to a worrisome degree.

Among the more important but less dramatic of these many problems has been the gradual souring of U.S.- European (in particular European Union [EU]) relations. Differences and irritants have accreted almost imperceptibly; there is no crisis. It is an insidious problem, undramatic and corrosive rather than explosive. But, if left unchecked, the slide toward estrangement could result in the relationship becoming one of the most serious in a series of troublesome issues confronting the United States.

If the United States is to continue to thrive in the 21^st century, it will be, in part, because the United States and Europe are cooperating closely. The Atlantic Community is a central repository of the values most of the world now seeks, and the economic and military power on which global stability and prosperity rest. United it can be a powerful force for global progress. But we can no longer count on that. If we and Europe evolve into hostile political, economic, and social competitors, the next 50 years could be sorry indeed.

There are three areas which, mostly by accident, have become most difficult. The first relates to U.S.-European defense capabilities and preparedness. Both the U.S. and the EU cut military expenditures sharply after the Cold War, but the EU cuts have been much more extensive. The consequence–as was vividly demonstrated in Kosovo-- has been a growing difficulty for European forces to operate in NATO in an integrated fashion with U.S. forces. At the same time, European desire for an EU defense capability, and resentment at heavy-handed U.S. behavior on security issues, has led to the creation of the European Security and Defense Program (ESDP), a plan to develop a capability to operate militarily independent of NATO, that is, when the U.S. chooses not to participate. Whether this program as it develops will turn out to be beneficial to NATO or severely disruptive remains to be seen.

The second issue relates to the almost miraculous amalgamation of Western Europe into the EU. It is now emerging as a single trading area, with enormous benefits for all. But the process of integration itself has often been difficult, sometimes acrimonious. Partly as a result, there has occasionally been a tendency to surmount internal friction by calling for unity against the U.S. This has led to a number of often petty disputes, especially in the economic and trade areas, and stands in the way of a conceptual dialogue over how the United States and an integrating and enlarging EU should relate to each other.

The final area relates to decisions at the end of the Cold War about the shape of Europe. At that time, there were perceived to be two big problems. The first was what to do about Russia. The second was what to do about Central/East Europe, the states lying between historic Germany and Russia which had for centuries been a periodic source of instability and conflict. The decision that was ultimately reached was to solve this latter problem at the expense of the Russian issue by expanding NATO. The Russians perceived–and continue to perceive–this as a hostile act. Attempts to ease Russian resentment through the creation of a Permanent Joint Council through which to consult with NATO only served to underscore their sense of isolation. Most additional candidates for NATO membership are increasingly neuralgic to Russia. The Russians could be excused for concluding we are trying to close the door permanently on their ever truly becoming a part of Europe, especially since they cannot hope for membership in the two institutions which at present tend to define Europe: NATO and the EU.

These and other contemporaneous irritants combine to threaten the unity of the Atlantic Community, a unity which has preserved Western values in the face of a forty-year assault by a hostile ideology. We should act now to reverse the negative current trends before irritation becomes estrangement. There are several positive steps which could be considered.

One such step relates to the defense industry consolidation which has been taking place on both sides of the Atlantic. If it is not already too late, that integration could be expanded to include cross-Atlantic combinations. Such a move would avoid the creation of two independent, competing defense industry pillars, which would increase costs, decrease capability and deepen the military and political fractures already noted. Rather, it would instill cooperation, maximize efficiency, broaden the market and spread costs. To move in this direction would require the U.S. to change its "buy America" preference bias and its regulations on technology transfer. Both of these restrictive practices are already becoming relics of a very different past. With the rapid changes in commercial, especially information, technology, and the world-wide sourcing of manufacture, it is becoming more and more difficult to assure secure, U.S.-only sources of supply in crisis and to deny permanently technology advances in technology to others. Technology policy instead should be to strive to stay ahead of the pack. For their part, the Europeans would have to drop their own "buy European" preferences and enforce effective export controls to prevent the global "bad actors" from acquiring the latest in weapons and technology.

Another step to consider would be the negotiation of a free trade agreement (FTA) between the EU and the U.S. While this would be a significant undertaking, particularly in the agriculture sector, the result, both in the economic and the political fields, would be a major strengthening of transatlantic bonds. It could as well serve as a point of departure, establishing a framework for the next global round of world trade negotiations. It might also make possible more rapid accession of Central/East European countries to the EU, were the U.S. in this way to be indirectly a party to their negotiations.

Finally, some way should be found to deal with the seemingly conflicting objectives of the integration of Russia into Europe and stability in Central/East Europe. As noted, the approach to NATO expansion has to date addressed the latter at the expense of the former. But there are steps which could help to engage Russia in the broad architecture of security in the Eurasian land mass. It might be possible, for example, to employ the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for that purpose. In the early ‘90's, the U.S. resisted giving OSCE a security role, out of concern that it might appear attractive as an alternative to NATO after the Cold War. That is no longer a live issue, and it might be time to invest OSCE with a modest security role, perhaps beginning as a consultative group. A directoire could be formed–consisting of the EU, Russia, the U.S. and a representative of the neutral or non-aligned OSCE members–to focus the larger issues of security. This, plus the incorporation of Central/East Europe in the EU, could permit a lengthy pause and perhaps even a de facto halt to NATO expansion, thus terminating a major source of tension between east and west in Europe.

These suggestions are illustrative. Whether or not they are the precise steps which should be taken to turn U.S.-European relations in a positive direction is a reasonable subject for policy debate. The primary objective must be to reverse trends now operating before they permanently disrupt what is still the world’s most important relationship.