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ISSUE
BRIEF
"Export Controls 2002: The Year to Reform"
By Daniel Poneman
January 8, 2002
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September 11 provided a grim
reminder of the need not only to cooperate closely with our
allies, but also to prevent advanced technologies from falling
into the hands of terrorists. Export controls are critical to this
effort. Unfortunately, the current system – designed for the
Cold War world – is badly out of date. To be effective against
today’s threats, export controls require major reform.
The need for reform...
The Cold War provided a clear enemy. At the same time, the U.S.
government dominated – through its own research and development
– the critical technologies that needed to be controlled. Allied
solidarity was strong enough to support an effective, multilateral
system of export controls (COCOM), which kept the most advanced
technologies from leaking to the Warsaw Pact, contributing both to
the military and economic collapse of the Soviet Union.
The world has changed. In addition to hostile regimes, we confront
a shadowy network of terrorists who slip easily across national
borders. In contrast to the past, critical technologies are now
being developed commercially in many countries, and adopted by
governments. COCOM has been replaced by the far weaker Wassenaar
Arrangements.
The effect of applying Cold War-era controls in the post-Cold War
world is not surprising. As international trade in technology has
multiplied in complexity and volume, our outdated system of export
controls has become more burdensome but less effective. The U.S.
continues to retain separate lists, rules, and bureaucracies to
control "dual-use" as well as "munitions"
items even as technological advances increasingly blur the
boundary between the two; certainly terrorist procurement networks
are not constrained by such artificial distinctions. Meanwhile,
the increasingly global availability of dangerous technology dooms
any export control effort absent strong multilateral cooperation.
In other words, today’s export controls do not trade profits for
security; they undermine both.
Go after needles, not haystacks...
How should we adapt to these new circumstances? The best way to
protect our technological edge is to unleash the energy and
creativity that underpin the great history of American invention.
This does not imply that we should abandon export controls, but
does suggest that we should apply them intelligently, and resist
them where they stifle American innovation more than they
constrain foreign adversaries. In order to be effective, export
controls must focus on controlling technologies, components, and
systems that are (1) chokepoints on the critical path to acquiring
military or terrorist capabilities, and (2) not widely available
from foreign sources. The Administration-supported Export
Administration Act represents a step in the right direction, but
only a step. For example, export controls can also damage our
national security when they impede defense cooperation with our
closest allies, e.g., in the co-development of advanced military
systems. Where export controls are ineffective, or block our own
technological progress, they should be abandoned. We should go
after the needles, not the haystacks.
In addition to updating our export controls, we must also reform
how they are administered. In the Internet Age, this should begin
with streamlined procedures and full use of modern information
technology. Focusing controls more sharply on critical
technologies will help. We should also assure that the U.S. export
control system for munitions as well as dual-use items is governed
by simple tenets of good government: transparency among government
agencies, deadlines that are clear and binding, default to
decision rather than to stalemate, and accountability of the
Cabinet secretary responsible for maintaining these procedural
disciplines. Indeed, the need for a modern and efficient system
raises the question whether the preservation of two parallel
systems still makes sense, or whether our national security would
be better served by an integrated system for administering both
dual-use and munitions controls.
Multilateral coordination and enforcement is essential...
Export control reform cannot succeed if we proceed in isolation.
Multilateral coordination and enforcement is essential, beginning
with a collective effort to develop the best data on today’s
global marketplace, detailing what technologies are available from
what suppliers. Answering that question will help the
Administration complete a realistic assessment of where controls
can be effective and where they cannot. We should also consider
initiatives to streamline licensing for close allies that
cooperate with us in managing and enforcing export controls. In
this way, we can enhance the effectiveness of both export controls
and the military capabilities of our coalition partners who join
us in combating terrorism.
The events of September 11 offer the best opportunity in a
generation to build a multilateral approach to export controls, so
that terrorists and proliferators cannot play one supplier off
against another. All significant suppliers – including Russia
and China – must cooperate fully if this effort is to be truly
effective.
For far too long, we have tended to view export controls as
inexorably pitting national security against commercial interests.
While such a tension surely will continue to exist in individual
cases, a reformed export control system can strengthen both
American security and American competitiveness. The Administration
and the Congress have a unique opportunity to achieve that
objective in 2002.
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