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SUMMARY
Embroiled in two diplomatically costly Middle Eastern wars and with the price of oil oscillating between $120 and $140 a barrel, the United States needs to diversify its circle of friends as well as its sources of energy. Even before the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, and certainly since, the US has come to view Kazakhstan as a key strategic partner, and Kazakhstan has been open to such a partnership. However, the creation in 2001 of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia and China illustrated the importance the Russians and Chinese give the region, and was, in the words of Martha Brill Olcott, "a warning to the United States that it could not take its foothold in Central Asia for granted."
The US heeded the warning. This February, the US and Kazakhstan signed a five-year military cooperation deal in which the US promised Kazakhstan to "help it bring its armed forces up to NATO standards." US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Mitchell Shivers, called the deal "a building block in the expanding partnership between our two nations." A joint statement between the US and Kazakh governments read, "We declare our intention to strengthen our security relationship through increased dialogue and defense military cooperation."
This was the most recent in a series of actions that have made both Russia and China wary; and, if in solidifying the US-Kazakh partnership Russia and China feel eclipsed, it may have some potentially serious consequences for the region.
THE IMPORTANCE OF KAZAKHSTAN
Oil
Of the three hydrocarbon-rich Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan—Kazakhstan holds the Caspian region's largest proven oil reserves—estimated between 9 and 40 billion barrels. It has 27 ongoing projects, three of which constitute its principal fields: the off-shore Tengiz and the Kashagan (the largest oil field outside of the Middle East), and the on-shore Karachaganak. These three oil fields hold a combined estimated amount of 15 to 20 billion barrels of oil, and are expected to produce a total of 1.2 billion bbl/d by 2010. In comparison, Uzbekistan has roughly 90 million barrels in the Central Ustyurt and Southwest Gissar projects, and 1.2 billion barrels in the Fergana Basin redevelopment, while Turkmenistan has about 600 million barrels in proven oil reserves split between the Cheleken and Habit Dag oil fields. While Kazakhstan's proven oil reserves equal approximately one-tenth of Saudi Arabia's, Kazakhstan constitutes one the largest non-OPEC sources of oil in the world.
Geopolitical Location
Flanked by two regional superpowers (Russia and China), crowning the four other countries of the Central Asian region, and claiming the northeast quadrant of the Caspian Sea as its own, Kazakhstan is auspiciously positioned to exercise its political and economic weight. Its easy access to the Caspian, which ferries Kazakh oil westward, has allowed Kazakhstan to diversify its economic partners to a fuller extent than the other Central Asian states. Although both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have abundant oil and gas reserves of their own, they have few international oil pipelines, and Uzbekistan is landlocked. Current Kazakh business partners include Chevron (US), British Gas, ENI (Italy), Korean National Oil Corp, Nelson Resources (Canada), Shell (the Netherlands), Oman Oil Company, Vegyepszer (Hungary), and Total (South Africa). In 2006, the $4 billion Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline began operation, shipping Central Asian oil from the Turkish port to global markets. This June, Kazakh President Nurusultan Nazarbayev reached an agreement with US energy giant Chevron on a new pipeline that would divert specifically Kazakh oil westwards away from Russia. The first stage of the project will ship oil from the Tengiz oil field to Kazakhstan's tanker port of Karyk. From there, the oil will either flow under the Caspian, which would necessitate a new pipeline, or the oil will be shipped to Baku to be loaded into the BTC. Either way, the Chevron deal is another thorn in the side of Russia, which still views Kazakhstan—and the rest of Central Asia—as its backyard.
RUSSIAN AND CHINESE INTERESTS IN KAZAKHSTAN
It was no coincidence that President Medvedev's first foreign visit was to Kazakhstan. "Moscow," as Martha Brill Olcott writes, "is pursuing a clear economic strategy in Central Asia, seeking dominance in the region's gas industry." As the Chevron deal illustrates, however, Russia has had increasing difficulty in keeping its "backyard" lashed to the will of the Kremlin. As more countries—including China—have come courting, Kazakhstan has felt safe to perform increasingly daring diplomatic acrobatics around Russian interests.
China, meanwhile, has been relatively slow to seek access to Kazakh resources, and has been spending less time securing Kazakh oil concessions than in establishing close, bilateral, security ties with each of the SCO states. But, it may shift its focus. An increasing number of border clashes have made China alert to the prospect of its own provinces breaking away; August 4 of this year saw one of the deadliest skirmishes in the western Xinjiang province in years, with sixteen Chinese policemen killed. In a move reminiscent of Turkey under Kemal Ataturk, China has sought to subdue its provinces through massive infrastructure projects, building roads, pipelines and railroad tracks. This has not only occupied the time and attention of the provinces, but has also brought China closer to Central Asia and its oil and gas resources. As China has come under increasing criticism for buying the bulk of its oil from Iran, therefore what has so far been a trickle of insubstantial Central Asian oil deals could blossom into a scramble to buy whatever concessions Russia and the West have left behind.
Russia and China are equally concerned about procuring a buffer against what they see as US encroachment on their territory. Soon after its inception, the SCO began conducting joint military exercises, most recently in Russia's Ural Mountains. For Moscow and Beijing, the SCO prevents the formation of an American-led security organization.
LOOKING AHEAD
The US seeks Kazakhstan's natural resources; Kazakhstan wants to pivot out of Russia's, as well as China's, sphere of influence. Both sides will continue to pursue, and stand to gain from, a greater partnership. However, this could have some unintended consequences.
The most probable scenario is that a growth in oil agreements akin to the Chevron deal could force Russia and China to begin exploring – and perhaps forcibly controlling - other oil locations, like Uzbekistan and the Ferghana Valley, which the Oil and Gas Journal estimates to hold 1.2 billion barrels of oil reserves and perhaps up to 4 billion barrels of undiscovered reserves. Therefore, in an effort to procure a geopolitical buffer while maintaining a secure source of oil, Russia and China may reprise their roles in the erstwhile Great Game, and spark a resurgence in great power proxy alignments.
Caroline Baxter was a Summer Associate at The Forum for International Policy in 2008. Ms. Baxter received her undergraduate degree from the University of St. Andrews and is currently working towards her M.A. in International Affairs at Columbia University. |