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Summary
A wave of Kurdish-sponsored terrorist attacks
in Turkey has heightened insecurity in the region and posed yet
another challenge for the troubled Turkish-American alliance. The
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a Kurdish separatist group that has
been engaged in violent conflict with the Turkish state for more
than twenty years, is believed to be responsible for the recent
attacks. Because the PKK is using the Kurdish region of northern
Iraq as a safe haven, the American and Iraqi governments have become
embroiled in this longstanding conflict. The challenge of managing
the competing interests of placating Istanbul and preserving the
relative stability of northern Iraq has limited Washington’s
options. With the long-term status of Turkey’s Kurds affected by
political developments in Iraq, Washington’s best policy option is
to use careful diplomacy to stave off Turkish military actions that
would further complicate the future of Iraq and the prospects for
peace in Anatolia.
Context of the
Conflict
Since the formation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the state has
had an uneasy relationship with its ethnic Kurds, who make up nearly
20% of the country’s population. The stated desire of certain
Kurdish groups for an autonomous or independent Kurdistan threatens
the territorial integrity and nationalist ideology of the Turkish
state. Founded in 1973, the PKK is Turkey’s most notorious advocate
of an independent Kurdistan. Known by its formal name as the
Kurdistan Worker’s Party, the PKK has its ideological foundation in
Marxist philosophy and Kurdish nationalism. The founding father of
the organization - Abdullah Ocalan - is revered by members and
sympathizers of the PKK.
Between 1984 and 1999, the PKK staged a ruthless rebellion that
involved suicide operations, kidnappings, attacks on Turkish
embassies abroad, and guerilla warfare against Turkish security
forces. This rebellion claimed up to 35,000 lives, including those
of Kurdish civilians who refused to cooperate with PKK activities.
The Turkish military responded to the insurgency with a heavy-handed
occupation of southeastern Turkey.
With the assistance of American intelligence, Turkish forces
captured and arrested Ocalan in Kenya after President Hafez al-Assad
evicted him from his Syrian sanctuary in 1998. Following Ocalan’s
arrest and the pressure of a sustained military campaign, the PKK
unilaterally declared a “cease-fire” in 1999, a term and concept
Ankara disputes and does not recognize. The PKK - estimated to
consist of roughly 5,000 militants - also established its primary
base of operations at an elaborate training camp in Qandil, the
mountainous region straddling the Iraq-Iran border. Since 2004, a
resurgent PKK has called off its cease-fire and resumed attacks upon
the Turkish state. Attacks in 2006 have even targeted foreign
tourists, an important source of foreign exchange for Turkey. The
PKK has taken advantage of the flood of weapons and disorder in a
post-Saddam Iraq to strengthen its position. Also, the de facto
establishment of an autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq has
provided Turkey’s Kurds with a vision for greater political
liberties at home.
Turkey has grown increasingly frustrated with the intensity of PKK
attacks on its interests, growing Kurdish autonomy in Iraq, and the
establishment of PKK bases in Iraq. Because the United States is the
occupying power in Iraq and a NATO ally, Ankara has pressured
Washington to take action against the PKK in Iraq. Washington is
forced to balance several important interests. It must work to
preserve the Turkish-American alliance, maintain good relations with
the Iraqi Kurds, preserve stability in northern Iraq, and
demonstrate policy coherence in the global war on terror. Faced with
mounting pressure from Ankara and threats of a unilateral Turkish
invasion of northern Iraq, the United States finally took action to
address the PKK problem in the summer of 2006.
America Acts
Washington’s most significant overture towards Turkey consisted of
naming General Joseph Ralston “Special Envoy for Countering the PKK”
in August 2006. As a former Supreme Allied Commander of Europe in
NATO, Gen. Ralston’s distinguished military career and good working
relationship with the Turkish military made him a natural choice for
the position. The respect and authority he commands with the armed
forces allows him to overcome the bureaucratic divide between
offices responsible for European and Middle Eastern affairs that
complicates resolution of the cross-border Kurdish issue.
General Ralston and the US government have struggled to counter the
popular perception in Turkey that he is a “PKK coordinator.” Ralston
will not meet with representatives of the PKK, which is designated
as a terrorist organization by the US, Turkey, and the EU.
Officially, his mission is to coordinate engagement with the Iraqi
and the Turkish governments to counter PKK activities. Ralston has
visited Turkey several times since his appointment in August,
meeting with the Foreign Minister and the Turkish general
responsible for the PKK. After his first round of meetings in
September, the Iraqi government closed down PKK and PKK-affiliated
offices throughout Iraq. This was an important practical step that
helped ease tensions between Turkey and Iraq. In addition, the
United States sent a top FBI agent to Ankara to help track down
sources of PKK funding.
Limited Policy Options
The US government has declared that it sees military action against
the PKK as a policy of last resort. While the option officially
remains on the table, the US military is unlikely to attack PKK
installations - or agree to a Turkish attack - so long as the rest
of Iraq remains unstable. With this in mind, the United States could
increase pressure on the Iraqis to frustrate the operations of the
PKK. For example, Iraq and Turkey could work together to limit the
transit of supplies to the Qandil region on the Iran-Iraq border
where thousands of PKK fighters and their families are based.
Finally, the US government could pressure the Iraqi government to
arrest some prominent PKK-affiliated individuals in Iraq, such as
Ocalan’s brother, Osman.
Ultimately none of these smaller scale policies is likely to lead to
the defeat of the PKK. In the short term, the best policy for the
United States is to allow General Ralston to continue his regional
diplomacy. The Turks will not have limitless patience with Ralston’s
efforts, however. Washington can do its part by pressuring Baghdad
for further cooperation against the PKK. In the longer term, the
political outcome of Iraq will have a significant impact on the
status of Turkey’s “Kurdish problem.” Washington’s best option is to
rely on General Ralston’s diplomacy to reduce tensions and prevent
Turkish military in northern Iraq that could further inflame the
region and strain Turkish-American relations.
Jeffrey Lightfoot was an Associate at The
Forum for International Policy in the Fall of 2006. Mr. Lightfoot
received his undergraduate degree from Indiana University, and is
currently working towards his M.A. from the Elliott School of
International Affairs at George Washington University. |